Sheffield Hallam: UCU State of the University Report 2026

Sheffield Hallam UCU Branch Committee

April 2026

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0. Executive Summary

0.1. The November 2025 Report

This update extends earlier analysis by Sheffield Hallam University (SHU) University and College Union (UCU). That report highlighted governance failures at SHU; expenditure outstripping income and inflation for a decade, but management still proceeding with a massive loan for new buildings in 2022. When Higher Education (HE) then faced challenges, SHU was woefully ill-prepared and responded with swingeing job cuts – 1000 in 24 months – impacting workload, staff morale, student choice and support. Rather than acknowledge these governance failures, management have pointed to factors outside their control and/or claimed that SHU spends too much on staff.

0.2. The 2026 Cuts

SHU management are proposing another £27m of cuts, which we believe will lock us into an irreversible cycle of decline (cuts lead to a deteriorating quality, falling league table position, fewer enrolments, even more cuts). This will have significant economic impacts on Sheffield. SHU is also proposing to transfer the majority of teaching staff to a subsidiary to avoid pensions obligations, and to cut more experienced staff.

This update allows us to challenge the employer's narrative, noting that:

- SHU is in a poor financial situation because of past governance failures, but current decision making seriously risks compounding the problems.
- SHU did not significantly increase income in the last decade, but rather lost market share, especially from 2018/19 onwards.
- Arguably SHU management misread the political situation and believed the relaxation of international study visas in 2021/22 would be more than temporary.
- Overall expenditure has not been out of line with the sector, but capital expenditure and finance costs, which skyrocketed from 2021/22, have been.
- SHU had the second most expensive restructure in the post-92 sector in the last decade, perversely spending huge sums of money in an attempt to save money.
- As a result of the cuts to date, our expenditure per student has dropped to within the lowest 25% of post-92 institutions (up to 2023/24). It does not appear that SHU has a greater proportion of experienced senior lecturing staff than other post-92s, but may end up with a much smaller one.
- SHU was amongst the worst 25% post-92s for staff-student ratios (class sizes), even before the cuts of summer 2025 and those planned for 2026.
- Combined with a tanking league table position this risks a cycle of decline that SHU management have not factored into their financial plans.
- Despite this, the number of staff earning over £100k has risen markedly and now places SHU in the top 25% of post-92s in absolute terms.

1. Introduction

Sheffield Hallam University (SHU) University and College Union (UCU) is publishing this update to our November 2025 report in response to another major wave of cuts at the University, combined with a very wide-ranging attack on terms and conditions, including pensions. In particular, we are interested in countering two narratives from management. Firstly, that the cuts have been largely precipitated by sector-wide dynamics, rather than governance failures at SHU. Secondly, that SHU is in some sense 'over-staffed' (i.e. spends more on staffing than comparable institutions across the sector). To do so we will compare SHU on a number of key measures to the whole 'post-92', former polytechnic sector in England (comprising 51institutions). Undertaking this analysis leads us to the conclusion that further cuts at SHU risks fuelling a cycle of decline, which will necessitate further cuts in the years to come.

1.1. The 2025 Report

Firstly, we want to recapitulate some of the evidence and arguments we set out in the report SHU UCU Branch Committee published last November, on the management and finances of the university over the last 15 years. That report was largely assembled based on publicly available Annual Report and Financial Statements for SHU.

The key findings we noted include:

- There was no cash windfall from the tripling of tuition fees in the early 2010s.
- There was a failure to contain costs, as well as increasingly unsustainable spending, including capital expenditure on new buildings.
- A key example was taking out a loan for £70m in early 2022, despite the fact that by that point the university had been consistently making a loss since 2017.
- The wider higher education sector began to experience challenges from 2020 onwards (due to a combination of inflation; the impact of the fees/student loans regime and the cost-of-living crisis on domestic demand; and the puncturing of the international student bubble in 2023/24), but SHU has been particularly exposed to these challenges due to past governance failures.
- Management have responded to these crises by cutting budgets by tens of millions to date and cutting 1000 staff in a little over 2 years.
- As a consequence of these cuts, the offer to students has been seriously undermined. Module choice has been virtually eradicated, student support cut down to the bone, class sizes are increasing, and the staff base is chronically overworked and demoralised.

1.2. The 2026 Cuts

The employer has recently announced another wave of cuts of approximately £27m[i]. These cuts further undermine staff morale and student experience, which are already sitting on a knife edge. They also risk locking the institution into an irreversible cycle of decline – cuts lead to a deteriorating position in league table rankings, leading to falling student numbers, necessitating even more cuts. These cuts will also have extremely serious consequences for the City of Sheffield. SHU has one of the largest 'multiplier effects' of British universities, creating 2.5 additional jobs in the local economy for every one job at SHU[ii]. Moreover, the staff cuts that have been tabled entail disproportionate cuts of more experienced (Senior Lecturer) staff grades, and their partial replacement by less experienced staff (Lecturers and Academic Tutors) on lower rates of pay.

1.3. The Wholly Owned Subsidiary Company

Management are not only threatening job losses but are proposing a wholesale attack on terms and conditions. These risk positioning SHU amongst the worst employers in UK Higher Education, permanently eroding the institution's ability to attract new talent. The employer wants to save money by transferring a large proportion of teaching staff out of Teachers' Pension Scheme, the government pension scheme that new universities ('post-92s') are required to offer to their staff[iii]. The only way that SHU can evade this legal responsibility is to transfer those staff to a 'Wholly Owned Subsidiary Company' (WOSC). Not only will such staff be driven into a 'teaching only' career track that undermines the public mission of the university to undertake, support and promote research, but UCU also fears that such a move would open the door to more wide-ranging attacks on both nationally and locally agreed terms and conditions.

1.4. A Note on TPS Obligations

SHU management would claim that they have been pushed into putting forward these proposals by the increasingly unsustainable costs of employer contributions to TPS. It is true that the decision by government to cover these increasing costs for schools and Further Education colleges in England and Wales, but not for post-92 universities, has put our kind of institution at a disadvantage[iv]. To the extent that post-92 universities like SHU are at the forefront of Widening Participation, supporting young people from working class and minoritised backgrounds into higher education, and thus sustaining social mobility[v], the government's role in creating an unequal playing field is completely unacceptable. This failure can and should be addressed by the provision of pensions relief by the government. Ultimately the government stands to lose if an increasing number of institutions and members pull out of a scheme which is directly funded by the treasury (i.e. there will be fewer current paying members to cover the outgoing costs of those already drawing a pension).

Nevertheless, the pension savings SHU wants to make are less than 1/3rd of the total savings that are currently planned, and perhaps a 1/10th of those made in the last 3 years. TPS pension obligations are not the cause of the poor state of SHU's finances, and SHU would have been better placed to weather this storm (like previous storms) were it not for the poor financial management of the last decade.

1.5. Challenging the Employer Narrative

A central way in which SHU management have sought to justify this current round of cuts is that the University has long spent a higher proportion of its income on staff costs than many comparable regional and national institutions. While historically this may have been the case (and our branch does not necessarily accept that this is a bad thing – teaching is after all a 'person-based activity'), we are sceptical that it remains true after we have shed a 1000 staff. But in making comparisons on the basis of staff costs, the employer's arguments led our committee to an analysis of SHU's position relative to the wider English post-92 sector (51 separate institutions, including SHU) on a number of different indicators[vi]. This preliminary analysis largely relies on Higher Education Statistics Authority (HESA) data[vii]. As always, we welcome feedback on our analysis and interpretation.

2. University Income and Expenditure

As can be seen in Figure 1, SHU did see rising income over the last decade, consistently above the Bank of England's key measure of inflation, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and sometimes above the Retail Price Index (RPI) measure. This figure, as with most subsequent figures compares SHU with those post-92 institutions above the 75th percentile (the best performing 25%), those below the 25th percentile (the worst performing 25%), and the median (middle 50%).

As can be seen, while SHU did increase income it did not do so at the same rate as many of our fellow post-92 institutions, and fell from a middling position to the edge of the bottom 25% over the course of the last decade.

Figure 1: Total Income of SHU Compared to Post-92 Sector 2015/16 – 2023/24, indexed to 2015/16



Figure 2 meanwhile shows that total expenditure at SHU increased at a relatively rapid rate at the beginning of the reference period, under the early years of Sir Chris Husbands' tenure as Vice-Chancellor but fell back towards the median average after 2018/19. Like the rest of the sector, increases in expenditure have been well above both measures of inflation, and this speaks to a failure of sectoral governance. However, elsewhere in the sector this may have been explained by steeply rising income, which was not the case at SHU.

Perhaps more importantly, however, SHU has performed very badly in terms of annual deficits from 2015/16 onwards (Figure 3), consistently being placed in the bottom 25% of all institutions. This suggests that action to address these issues should have occurred much sooner.

Figure 2: Total Expenditure of SHU Compared to Post-92 Sector 2015/16 – 2023/24, indexed to 2015/16



Figure 3: Surplus/(Deficit) of SHU Compared to Post-92 Sector 2015/16 – 2023/24, indexed to 2015/16



Over the reference period, SHU has also seen a declining market share (Figure 4). As one of the largest universities in the country, it starts from a high base in 2015/16 at around 3.5% of total income of post-92 universities, but this falls to around 3% by the end of the reference period. This occurred amidst an upwards trend in the number of UK domiciled students up to at least 2024[viii]. The latter has been attributed to a demographic bulge in the 18-year-old population that led to the demand for hundreds of thousands of additional university places[ix].

Figure 4: SHU Market Share as a % of Total Income of Post-92 Sector 2015/16 – 2023/24



In Figure 5 we can see that income per student at SHU has been low compared to the rest of the sector, with the partial exception of 2020/21 and 2021/22. Income by student is primarily a product of the mix between the number of enrolled domestic students (whose fees were capped at £9k from 2012, and rose to £9,250 in 2017) and international students (whose fees are uncapped and usually much higher)[x]. This would tend to suggest that over the referenece period SHU has educated a greater proportion of domestic students than the wider post-92 sector.

Figure 5: Income per Student, SHU Compared to Post-92 Sector 2015/16 – 2023/24



Nevertheless, while income may have been low relative to the post-92 sector, expenditure per student has also been relatively low, dropping off rapidly towards the bottom 25% in the academic year 2023/24, when the swingeing cuts started to take effect (Figure 6).

Figure 6: Expenditure per Student, SHU Compared to Post-92 Sector 2015/16 – 2023/24



3. University Costs

As noted above, SHU UCU have long questioned the wisdom of expensive capital expenditure projects by the University on new buildings here in Sheffield, as well as investment in a new campus in Brent Cross, London. Focusing only on buildings in Figure 7, we can see a spike in expenditure in 2018/19, followed by a second larger spike between 2022/23 and 2023/24, associated with the new city centre campus. What is notable here is a major increase in expenditure at precisely the moment when the rest of the post-92 sector was spending less.

Figure 7: Capital Expenditure on Buildings as a % of Total Annual Income, SHU Compared to Post-92 Sector 2015/16 – 2023/24



In terms of the Brent Cross development specifically[xi], SHU UCU has long cautioned against the wisdom of this speculative development, noting that no less than 32 provincial and private universities have opened London campuses in the last couple of decades, chasing the international student market. Not only is SHU very late to the party (21 of the 32 predate 2020), but these other London outposts have had very mixed results (6 are already closed) and the kinds of student numbers SHU has claimed it will recruit (5,000 a year[xii]) has only been achieved by three universities (Coventry, Sunderland, West of Scotland), all of whose London outposts have been open for a decade or more.

The consequences of that this combined additional expenditure is an associated increase in debt financing costs, putting SHU well above the rest of the sector by 2022/23-2023/24 (Figure 8). This represents a significantly increased drain on resources.

Figure 8: Interest and Other Finance Costs as a % of Total Annual Income of SHU Compared to Post-92 Sector 2015/16 – 2023/24



Taking a slightly longer view, Figure 9 shows that SHU had one of the highest ratios of total loans to total income (placing it in the 'worst' 25% - boxes represent the median 50%) over the period 2015/16 to 2023/24. In cash terms, SHU took out the second highest amount in loans of all post-92 institution between 2015/16 and 2023/24.

Figure 9: Total Loans, as a % of Total Income, SHU Compared to Post-92 Sector 2015/16-2023/24



This combination of relatively lavish expenditure on buildings on the back of relatively poor underlying financial performance is represented in SHU's 'debt service ratio', that is, net operating income divided by total debt service. A ratio of 1.0 indicates that for every £1 SHU must cover in debt payments it is bringing in £1 in operating income. However, while this ratio was substantially higher than this in 2020/21 (as shown in Figure 10), the ratio deteriorated rapidly from that year onwards, at precisely the moment SHU took out major additional loans. In the most recent year for which we have data (2023/24), SHU was bringing in barely 30p in operating cash for every £1 it had to pay in debt servicing.

SHU UCU has suspected that the covenants (or conditions) applied to the recent loans were relatively strict/punitive compared to sector norms. While management have denied this is the case, their position would presume a degree of credulity on the part of the banking industry. That is to say, why would banks not attach punitive conditions to a university plummeting towards the worst 25% in terms of profitability?

Figure 10: Debt Service Ratio, SHU Compared to Post-92 Sector, 2020/21-2023/24



Although the restructures at SHU in the last couple of years have been ostensibly premised on reducing costs, Figure 11 shows that the restructure in early 2024 was the second most expensive in the post-92 sector in the last decade, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of annual income (10.7%). It should be noted that the time series ends at April 2024, before further major restructuring/staff cuts over the summer of 2025.

Figure 11: Annual Cost of Restructures at SHU Compared to Post-92 Sector



Figure 12 focuses on a crucial issue, namely staff costs at Sheffield Hallam University relative to the rest of the post-92 sector. As noted above, SHU management are aiming for a reduction of more experienced staff and their (partial) replacement with more junior staff. However, the data suggests that the proportion of more experienced staff (band 5 and to some extent band 4) at SHU were not out of line with the rest of the sector and have already fallen as a result of the significant cuts of the last two years. The proposed cuts therefore risk further eroding the offer to students at SHU, relative to other post-92 institutions.

Figure 12: Full-Time Academic Staff Numbers by Salary, Indexed to Total Number of FT Academic Staff in 2014/15, SHU Compared to Post-92 Sector



Nb: Salary bands are adjusted each year in line with pay rises, banding at 24/25 classifications equates to Band 1: < £23,58, Band 2: ≥ £23,581 and < £29,659, Band 3: ≥ £29,659 and < £39,105, Band 4: ≥ £39,105 and < £52,183, Band 5: ≥ £52,183 and < £69,757, Band 6: ≥ £69,757

Nevertheless, while expenditure on academic staff might not be out of kilter with the wider post-92 sector, spending on senior staff (relative to income generated) has soared over the last five years, with SHU rising from a position where the cost of senior salaries consistently placed the University in the bottom 25% of institutions, to the top 50% in relative income in the space of only three years (Figure 13). In absolute terms, the number of SHU employees earning over £100k per year has increased far faster than other institutions, rising from the 36th percentile within the post-92 sector in 2019/20 to the 75th percentile in 2023/24, meanwhile its income and marked share has moved in the opposite direction.

Figure 13: Number of Staff Earning Over £100k per £100m Institutional Income, SHU Compared to Post-92 Sector, 2016/17-2023/24



As a result of recent restructures there also seems to have been a recent explosion in senior academic staff (not including professors) who primarily undertake management roles. This means that up to 1 in 10 academic staff, we assume largely the relatively newly created Associate Heads, are assigned to predominantly management roles, with limited teaching (Figure 14).

Figure 14: Other Senior Academics per 1000 FTE students, SHU Compared to Post-92 Sector – 2024/25



We see a very different story when we turn to the Grades 7 – 9 staff who are primarily responsible for delivering teaching and research at SHU (Figure 15).

Figure 15: Other Contract Level Academics per 1000 FTE Students, SHU Compared to Post-92 Sector – 2024/25



Here we can see that the number of such staff (Lecturer, Senior Lecturer, Principal Lecturer, Research Fellow, Senior Research Fellow, Principal Research Fellow) relative to student numbers has fallen over the last decade.

In Figure 16 we look at staff costs as a percentage of total income at SHU. This shows a significant downward trend as a result of various rounds of cuts. It should also be noted that this time series only extends to April 2025, so will not include significant further cuts that were made over the summer of 2025.

Figure 16: Total Staff Costs as a % of Income at SHU, 2016-2025



Finally, Figure 17 demonstrates the extent to which the cuts that have already been made are bringing expenditure back into line with income. This informs our contention that there are alternatives to further cuts.

Figure 17: Income, Expenditure & Inflation at SHU, indexed to 2011 – 2024/25



4. Students, Staffing Ratios and League Table Position

In this final section of our analysis, we explore overall student numbers and associated staffing levels. What we can see in Figure 18, reinforcing the analysis above, is that SHU failed to increase the number of full-time students over the 2010s, seeing its position fall from the median towards the bottom 25% of institutions by the end of the reference period. The partial exception to this is the period 2022/23 to 2023/24, when the University received a sudden boost in international students. This was associated with the introduction of the Graduate Route Visa in July 2021, which allowed visa holders to stay in Britain for work for up to 2 years after completion of a Bachelors or Masters degree. However, quite predictably, given the increasing controversy around immigration from the right of British politics over the last decade, the student visa regime was subject to tightening from January 2024 onwards, with a ban on student visa holders bringing their dependents (families) with them[xiii]. As has been widely reported, this had devastating impacts on international postgraduate taught recruitment at SHU[xiv]. Further tightening will occur on the 1st January 2027, as the period that a visa holder can stay on completion of their studies will reduce from 24 to 18 months[xv].

We can only speculate that perhaps SHU undertook the major additional capital expenditure in early 2022 on the premise that the bubble in international student recruitment would last longer than 2 years.

Figure 18: Total FTE Students at SHU Compared to Post-92 Sector, Indexed to 2014/15 - – 2024/25



Figure 19 further illustrates this declining market share for Full-Time students. Figure 4 highlights a similar trend, but the downturn is smoothed in that earlier graph by increasing research income. As we noted in our earlier report, that income could be threatened going forward by a seeming de-prioritisation of research signalled through the loss of experienced senior staff, including research centre leaders, the suspension of progression, and a narrative in which research is seen as ‘too expensive’. The recently announced proposals for further cuts only compound these concerns, as a majority of academic staff stand to be transferred to a ‘teaching only’ career track under the WOSC.

Figure 19: Market Share for Total FTE Students, SHU Compared to Post-92 Sector, Indexed to 2014/15 – 2024/25



In Figure 20 we look at the proportion of different kinds of students at SHU relative to the post-92 sector. What this shows is an increasing reliance on Postgraduate Taught (PGT) student recruitment (presumably many of these are international Masters students), like the rest of the post-92 sector. However, unlike the rest of the post-92 sector, there is a significant decline in First Degree (Bachelors) students (which unlike other post-92 institutions had not risen at an earlier point in the reference period). This dip takes place alongside the beginning of budget cuts from December 2023 onwards.

Figure 20: Full-Time Students by Degree Type, SHU Compared to Post-92 Sector, Indexed to 2014/15 – 2024/25



Figure 21 examines Staff-Student Ratios (SRR) at SHU compared to the wider post-92 sector. As can be seen, SHU is now firmly in the lowest quartile (the worst performing 25%) for SSR. This is a crucial piece of evidence, as it supports our contention that the scale of the cuts at SHU is undermining the offer to students, risking a continuing cycle of decline. Again, this data will not include the cuts of the summer 0f 2025, suggesting our position is already much worse than indicated here.

Figure 21: Staff Student Ratios of SHU (bold dot) Compared to Post-92 Sector, Complete Universities Guide 2026



On this specific point, we reproduce a graph from our November report, as Figure 22, which demonstrates the impact of the cuts to date on SHU's league table position (not including the cuts of summer 2025 or those that are currently proposed).

Figure 22: Complete University Guide League Table Rankings 2010-2026 (out of 130)



5. Conclusion

SHU UCU has produced this report because we are profoundly concerned with the direction of travel of our institution.

Our analysis points in the direction of systematic governance failures across the whole of UK Higher Education, which have been widely noted[xvi]. The tripling of tuition fees and the end of student number caps for individual institutions no doubt created a competitive environment that encouraged risk-taking. And successive governments seemingly forget to attach any meaningful penalties to the behaviour of university leaders whose risk-taking produces failure.

What this and our previous November 2025 reports suggest, however, is that the governance failures at SHU have been particularly egregious. A failure to contain costs as market share was lost, coupled with increasingly speculative and risky expenditure, has culminated in unprecedented cuts. These cuts have obviously taken a heavy toll on staff who have lost their jobs, been pushed into retirement earlier than they had planned, pushed out of their chosen vocation, or saddled with increasingly unmanageable workloads. They have certainly taken a toll on students, with declining subject and module choice, savage cuts to student support, and increasing class sizes. And they have also taken a toll on this city, in terms of the lost economic activity and demand that both staff and students create.

Government – national and local - clearly has a role to play in all of this. We would hope for better regulation of Higher Education going forward, if the sector has any hope of retaining its world-leading status[xvii]. We demand relief on TPS employer contributions and an end to the uneven playing field that disadvantages the post-92 sector, and the students of disproportionately working-class and minoritised ethnic backgrounds that we serve. And we insist that all local politicians take a greater interest in the fate of our university – built by and to serve local people - than has often been the case up until now.

Most immediately, we want our present senior management to put forward a vision for the University which does not entrench the current cycle of decline. While we have heard much about the inevitability of the current cuts, we have heard no bold – or even credible - vision from the employer on reversing the decline we have documented above. The previous rounds of cuts have already reduced costs significantly; additional cuts now will only further erode the student offer and the reputation of the university. Other choices – including the slowing of capital expenditure – are possible. We urge SHU's current management to reconsider their position before additional damage is done.

6. References

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[vi] **Selection of comparator universities**

- Sector-wide comparisons in this report assess the performance of Sheffield Hallam University (SHU) against all identified large post-1992 universities in England offering a wide range of courses. Small and specialist institutions have been excluded, as have universities in the devolved nations, where differences in funding models and inconsistencies in the availability of comparable publicly reported metrics limit meaningful comparison.
- The analysis draws on data from the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA). The comparator group comprises the following fifty institutions (in addition to SHU):
    - Anglia Ruskin University, Bath Spa University, Birmingham City University, Bournemouth University, Buckinghamshire New University, Canterbury Christ Church University, Coventry University, De Montfort University, Edge Hill University, Kingston University, Leeds Beckett University, Leeds Trinity University, Liverpool Hope University, Liverpool John Moores University, London Metropolitan University, London South Bank University, Middlesex University, Oxford Brookes University, University of Roehampton, Southampton Solent University, Teesside University, Manchester Metropolitan University, Nottingham Trent University, University of Brighton, University of Chichester, University of East London, University of Greenwich, University of Huddersfield, University of Lincoln, University of Northampton, University of Portsmouth, University of Sunderland, University of West London, University of Westminster, University of Winchester, University of Wolverhampton, University of Bedfordshire, University of Chester, University of Cumbria, University of Derby, University of Gloucestershire, University of Greater Manchester (Bolton), University of Hertfordshire, Northumbria University, University of Plymouth, University of Staffordshire, University of Suffolk, University of the West of England, Bristol, University of Worcester, York St John University.
- Where possible, results are presented using quartiles. This approach reduces the influence of outliers when identifying sector trends and minimises the impact of contentious inclusion or exclusion decisions within the comparator group. In cases where quartile presentation is not feasible (e.g. Figures 12 and 20), all comparator institutions are aggregated and treated as a single group.
- Given the fragmented nature of the post-1992 university sector in England, where no single institution accounts for more than 5% of total income over the period analysed, it is unlikely that any individual institution materially biases the overall findings.

[vii] **Sources of date from HESA:**

- Higher Education Statistics Agency. (2025). *Table 1: Consolidated statement of comprehensive income and expenditure 2015/16 to 2024/25 (DT031)*. https://www.hesa.ac.uk/data-and-analysis/finances/table-1 **(Figures 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 13)**

- Higher Education Statistics Agency. (2026). *Table 2: HE student enrolment FTE by HE provider and level of study, 2014/15 to 2024/25*. https://www.hesa.ac.uk/data-and-analysis/students/table-2 **(Figures 5, 6, 14,15)**
- Higher Education Statistics Agency. (2025). *Table 10: Separately disclosed material items from the audited financial statement of comprehensive income and expenditure, year ended 31 July 2015/16 to 2023/24*. https://www.hesa.ac.uk/data-and-analysis/finances/table-10 **(Figures 8, 11)**
- Higher Education Statistics Agency. (2025). *Table 14: Key financial indicators by HE provider and academic year, academic years 2015/16 to 2024/25*. https://www.hesa.ac.uk/data-and-analysis/finances/table-14 **(Figure 10)**
- Higher Education Statistics Agency. (2025). *Table 4: Consolidated statement of cash flows, academic years 2015/16 to 2024/25*. https://www.hesa.ac.uk/data-and-analysis/finances/table-4 (**Figure 9)**
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